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Coming Home 
Marc L. Joslyn 
Bainbridge Island, Washington, USA 
Since my first attempt in 1975 to cover the gap between Zen and Western 
psychology, I have returned repeatedly to this topic from various approaches. The 
present work deals with the alienation of self from environment which prevails 
nowadays. Fear of death is considered as a primary factor in the abstraction from 
nature of the civilizing process. Making nature the enemy of humankind, 17th 
century scientism (science and religion) invented a worldview fixating a late phase 
of the civilizing process with notions that split human awareness from both 
environment and body. Rather than relying mainly on traditional Buddhist 
literature, insights of modern Western writers are used to see through these 
alienating notions and come home to immediate experience. 
Become aware as leaves are aware 
and fine as flowers are fine 
and fierce as fire is fierce 
and subtle, silvery, tinkling and rippling 
as rain-water, 
but a man reborn from the rigidity of fixed ideas 
resurrected from the death of mechanical motion and 
emotion. 
Man knows nothing 
till he knows how not to know. 
[from two poems by D. H. Lawrence (1933)] 
ANY ZEN-LIKE sparks can be found in 
Western literature. Instead of pro-
ceeding then from traditional Buddhist 
literature, let's begin with such sparks, in this 
case some excerpts from D. H. Lawrence. Seeking 
a home outside his native, industrialized 
England, Lawrence wandered the world while 
slowly dying of tuberculosis. Early in this 
wandering he rejected the impression he got of 
Buddhism in Ceylon. It seemed to deny the 
struggle, the pain, the two-sidedness of life. It 
seemed too mechanical, ritualistic, pacifistic, and 
smug. In time though, he realized that being at 
home goes beyond liking or disliking one's 
surroundings, beyond clinging to what pleases 
and avoiding what displeases. He penetrated the 
shallow seeking-for-pleasant-permanence and 
discovered being at home with impermanence 
itself. Whatever his realization is called, it points 
to true Buddhism. 
Biographer Geof Dyer (1997) quotes someone 
who remembered that "Lawrence was always 
busy, 'mostly doing housework.' When he was not 
building sheds and cupboards, putting up shelves 
and repairing outhouses he was doing 'the 
washing, cooking, :floor-cleaning and everything': 
making home, in short" (p. 142). Dyer quotes 
someone else who remembered that Lawrence 
was able "to absorb himself completely in what 
he was doing at the moment" (p. 149) and 
furthermore "knew how to do nothing. He could 
just sit and be perfectly content" (p. 152). He also 
quotes Lawrence himself who wrote toward the 
end of his short life " ... sitting in the sun and 
seeing the easy, drifting life of the place. That's 
how I am happiest nowadays-just sitting still, 
quite alone, with a little friendly life to watch" (p. 
165). 
O.K. But what does Lawrence mean by "how 
not to know" in the introductory poem? "Knowing" 
in the modern sense is primarily a process of 
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automatically allocating whatever occurs to 
places in the fixed, memorized system we each 
regard as "the world." Knowing is more or less a 
process of abstraction, of separating oneself from 
the immediate event, treating it in a piecemeal 
fashion, substituting aspects of it with prepro-
cessed segments of the past. The more fixated the 
demands of knowing, the less newness or 
freshness allowed to any event. Experiencing an 
event which is not quickly and easily pigeonholed 
may result in feeling at sea or disoriented. This is 
not to say that we can live without knowing, only 
that knowing is not the basis of living. Living 
includes knowing and a lot more besides. 
Being at home requires a sense of unity with all 
events, favorable or unfavorable. While "seeing 
the easy, drifting life of the place," Lawrence is 
not mere onlooker. He becomes what he sees. He 
has rediscovered immediate experience prior to 
knowing. One can never be at home in just 
knowing because of its divisiveness, distancing, 
and substitute abstractions. Much of what we 
regard as freedom depends on sensing that an 
event originates with "I" or is at least in accord 
with "I." The denser and more fixed one's "I," the 
larger "non-I" will seem, and the more like an 
object one is apt to feel, compelled by events 
originating from an alien world. 
Lawrence is an individual of our time, someone 
who struggled intensely with the disheartening 
drabness and ugliness of industrial England and 
then the horrors of World War I and its 
aftermath. How does his struggle relate to us? 
How do we experience the "death of mechanical 
motion and emotion" which separated Lawrence 
from coming home and from which he longed to be 
resurrected? Let's examine those features in the 
prevailing worldview (which can be summarized 
as "scientism") that reinforce absolute splits 
between self and world, self and others, mind and 
body, spirit and matter, and so forth. 
~ Scie:ntism ~ 
SCIENCE PER SE is a modest activity, the results 
of which are educated guesses or "the best 
explanations so far" and which may be amended 
later or even overthrown. In science proper, there 
is no denial of the contextual nature of initial 
assumptions, no claim that its views and methods 
are the only paths to reality. In scientism, on the 
other hand, there is a claim that initial 
assumptions are external givens, or eternal, and 
unquestionable truths. In scientism, furthermore, 
other activities with nonscientistic assumptions 
are denied any relevance to reality. Other views 
are treated as subjective, mystical, or, at best, as 
mere imitations of science. It is this absolutist 
aspect which adds the "ism" to science, making it a 
:religion of sorts that belittles any questioning of its 
tenets. 
From his telescopic view, Galileo generalized 
that only single-eye vision was "objective" in 
perceiving features of astronomic bodies such as 
size and number which could be mathematized to 
describe what he took to be the clockwork universe 
of God (Master Mathematician). Descartes, Newton 
and others elaborated this view, assuming that 
everything in the universe could be reduced to 
irreducible, immortal bits of matter (miniature 
planetary bodies or atoms) and relations between 
the bits could be explained in terms of mechanical 
laws. The corollary is that human beings are cut 
off from each other and thus cannot agree on 
anything that involves the full range of their 
sensations and feelings. There is no organic or 
living unity in this view. After Creation (however 
it's conceived) there are no single, encompassing 
events. Uniqueness or quality is pluralized to 
numerical group occurrences which are mechani-
cally caused and causing. 
And there is no inside. Everything is cut off 
from and therefore outside of everything else. So-
called objectivity becomes equivalent to being 
outside, distanced even from one's own body. 
Inside experience is questionable at best. A 
consensus can occur only if human beings accept 
and imitate the plural separateness of things in 
the universe via supposedly objective, numerical 
statements. Mter the 17th century, God was :retired 
from the picture. Hence all remaining aspects of 
inside like "life" and "mind" were also subtracted. 
Mter Darwin in the 19th century, life became just 
an epiphenomenon evolving from random 
associations of matter bits. As useful, temporary 
simplifications which foster research, there is 
nothing wrong with such assumptions. It is 
another matter, however, when they become ends 
in themselves and are simplistically taken as the 
true condition of the universe and its contents. 
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Ironically, quantum physics and other devel-
opments since the 1920s have undermined most 
scientistic assumptions. Atoms are no longer 
immortal, indivisible building blocks of the 
universe. Matter (things) and energy (actions) 
are now interchangeable, and so on. But, despite 
evidence to the contrary in physics, scientism still 
prevails, particularly in social sciences trying to 
ape the "certainty" of 17th century physics. And 
for millions of nominal Christians, Jews (lately 
also Muslims and Buddhists), scientism has 
become the main source of expectations for 
miraculous answers to human problems, from 
the curing of all diseases to the discovering of 
unlimited natural energy. 
Science has developed mainly by successive 
degrees of refining instrumentation in accord 
with scientific models. Since scientific methods 
are predominantly abstract and utilize only a 
small part of human experience, it is scientistic 
monopolization to insist that they are purely 
"empirical" and other methods are not. Most 
scientific theory is actually idealistic or several 
steps removed from the empirical basis with 
which we are all born. Every event in nature 
when fully experienced has a unique here-and-
now quality. Reducing that unique quality to 
quantities of one sort or another is actually 
dematerializing matter for some abstract techno-
logical or commercial purpose. To call faith in this 
quantitative reduction "materialism" is another 
misnomer, because matter in its natural state is 
destroyed and abstracted to other ends. 
Similarly, what we now refer to as "nature" has 
become denatured, or gravely impoverished, as 
worldwide ecological problems recently :reveal. 
But the experience-constricting aspect of our 
scientistic worldview is concealed from us by 
abstract, human-made seasons, climate condi-
tions, architectural structures, and other devices 
with which we have surrounded ourselves. There 
is no nature remaining as a single expression of 
multiple relationships. There are as many 
natures as specialization dictates. Once quanti-
fied, each unique event is lost in pluralized 
samples or groups. A reified group standard by 
which a person is rated, like an LQ. test, is more 
"real" than the person. In the pseudodemocracy of 
statistical averages, "political correctness" is 
inevitable. An individual seeking for integrity on 
her/his own beyond prevailing bureaucratic 
answers may be suspect of elitism, heresy, or 
even insanity. Enthusiastic involvement or 
advocacy is risky because being outside 
(uninvolved, or "cool") has become a kind of 
pseudo-objective group morality. 
Formal logic is a denial of time in that it begins 
with the assumption of pure identity for its 
entities, and posits (with the law of the excluded 
middle) that those entities can never become 
other than the way they are initially defined. It 
might be objected here that the notion of a 
variable in mathematics allows for change, but 
reconsideration will show that once defined, a 
variable too becomes a changeless thing. A 
statement like 2 + 2 = 4 is "eternal," that is, true 
in every time and place, because it belongs in a 
closed, fixed, numerical system that we clever 
humans have created. That an answer is yet to be 
found, like 2 + 2 = ? can mislead us into thinking 
the system is open-ended. But once the 
preliminaries of a question are quantified, the 
answer already lies somewhere within the 
numerical system. Finding the answer is only a 
question of "crunching" the numbers. Many 
aspects of nature can fruitfully be depicted as 
quantitative ratios or relationships. Most of those 
aspects have occurred in the realm of physics, the 
most successful and therefore envied science. 
The scientistic assumption is that the rest of 
nature can and should be similarly quantified. 
The catch is the character of numbers. We take it 
for granted that there is an absolute difference 
between 0 and 1, like nothing and something, or 
an absolute difference say between 3 and 4, but in 
a continuous phenomenon at what point does 3 
become 4, when it's 3.6 o:r 3.999? We take it for 
granted that there is an equal distance between 
any two successive numbers such that 4 - 3 = 1 
and 12587 - 12586 = 1 but does nature itself 
function with such ideally equal units? 
Regarding scientific research with respect, but 
far-less-than-holy reverence for numbers, leads 
to the view that progress has been mainly a 
matter of learning how far nature will play our 
game and allow itself to be manipulated via 
quantified, abstract models imposed on it. In 
other words, it isn't so much nature per se that 
has been revealed as progressive refinements in 
applying closed, human-made models to nature. 
Although more or less appropriate to a given 
natural phenomenon, a scientific model does not 
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actually "predict" the workings of a phenomenon. 
The potential answer is already contained in the 
idealized model which is closed off to everything 
but certain possibilities. A correct prediction is not 
a direct manifestation of nature per se but rather 
the possibility that a very limited aspect of nature 
is acting (for the time being at least) in parallel to 
the idealized model. 
One could predict human behavior, for 
example, with very high accuracy if experimental 
subjects were enclosed in a concentration camp. 
The more limited the situation and the fewer the 
alternatives for responding, the greater the 
certainty of behavioral prediction. Add to this 
closed situation a total control of life-and-death 
variables like air, light, warmth, food, water, 
sleep, cleanliness, private space, dignity, and the 
certainty is still greater. Torture and the threat of 
death would just be certainty overkill. Without 
some appraisal of everything that's omitted from 
the closed situation at the outset, prediction per 
se is a kind of illusion. The ultimate test of any 
behavior-predicting theory is how well it might 
work in "the field," that is, in life itself, with a 
minimum of freedom-depriving restrictions and 
unnatural conditions. 
The main appeal of tidy measures, closed 
situation experiments, and mechanistic theories 
is probably that they are the easiest way to 
proceed, not the truest way, when all they 
exclude is reconsidered. It could be argued that 
with an appropriate model nature will respond 
"as if' nature were indeed the model itself. 
Models like those which facilitate interplanetary 
rocket navigation are remarkably apt. But with 
scientism, the "as if" is forgotten and the model 
becomes a "law" of nature. Nature is so extensive 
and flexible that almost any model will work to 
some extent like a cookie mold. Aspects of a 
natural situation which don't fit a mold are just 
excised. Cumulatively, however, excised scraps 
are greater by far than the world presented by 
cookie molds, and there are limits to the tolerance 
of nature, as ecological disasters remind us. 
._, 1st Answer to Scientism: Time ea. 
Do WE have any right to question the 
assumptions of scientism unless we are 
academically qualified cosmologists, biologists, 
or psychologists? Jacques Barzun in his study of 
science as "Glorious Entertainment" comments 
that "all these [scientistic] reasons for distrusting 
mind ... rob man of his supreme pleasure and 
prerogative, which is to feel himself at once a 
moral being and a natural philosopher" (1965, p. 
303). And he adds: "So deprived, he [man] cannot 
wonder at the disease of the will and the emotions 
which plague him, and against which all the signs 
of control over nature through knowledge and 
machinery will not avail" (p. 303). Much gratitude 
is due to academically qualified renegades like 
historian Barzun (1964), mathematician V. V. 
Nalimov (1981), and physicist Robert S. Jones 
(1982), who encourage us to question, as they do, 
the "reality'' of our alienation. 
Let's take courage from the fact that at birth 
we obviously did not sense ourselves as alienated 
from the world and others, that the impression of 
absolute separation is something we picked up on 
the way to becoming adults. We don't have to 
dispute the findings of cosmologists and others 
who assume the responsibility of telling us what 
is real. We can remind ourselves that their 
findings are best-guess human interpretations 
rather than complete and final structures 
imposed on us from outside. We don't have to be 
overawed by operational definitions and math-
ematical equations. We don't have to wait 
centuries for final proofs or disproofs of this or 
that theory of existence. We don't have to regret 
not living in some future age when a totally 
controlled nature as promised by scientism will 
supposedly occur, where we might live in perfect 
human-made cities on planets in other galaxies 
without disease, poverty, natural calamities or 
unpredictable surprises. Here and now we can 
return to the source of our dilemma which is 
human thinking alienated in a world view created 
by human thinking. 
Ecology (like economy, appropriately from the 
Greek word oikos for ''home" or "house") is doing 
the best job it can of reminding other sciences 
about "coming home," that is, their responsibility 
for bringing abstract findings back to the living 
world, back to human discourse in general, back 
to sustaining life on a planet which may be the 
only place in the universe capable of life. Beyond 
ecology however, facing a homeless universe can 
only be resolved finally by rediscovering the true 
nature of "self' and immediate experience. 
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Before we abstract it as a straight line along 
which events evolve, driven by past conditions in 
a fixed spatial shell, what is time? Let's take up 
the paradox of time by considering how we 
experience a song. As a song unfolds it becomes 
other than what it has been to become what it 
shall be. When is a song complete? Only when it's 
finished and no longer heard. That's obvious. It is 
not as obvious that this is the case with 
everything else. But, if we give ourselves over to 
the question and realize that any "thing" is 
primarily an event, then it becomes clear that 
what is identical with itself is in the process of self-
change and therefore is not identical with itself. 
What is itself is also not itself. Just pondering on 
and living out the implications of this fact alone 
could liberate us from the tyranny of our :reified 
notions and open us to what might be called 
immediate experience. The presence of any thing 
must (at least partially) encompass its absence 
also. There is no such thing as a pure "something" 
present all at once and surrounded by pure "non-
something" like an island alone in a sea of time/ 
space. Nor is there any such thing as pure 
"present" since any event is at any moment also 
partly past and partly future. 
There seems to be a predilection in language 
for dividing experience into two rough categories: 
more enduring events (nouns, things) and less 
enduring events (verbs, actions). Verbs are then 
regarded as less real than nouns, as initiated by 
and therefore as only potential attributes of nouns. 
We define something in terms of its attributes 
(adjectives describing its features, and adverbs 
describing how it acts). None ofthe attributes have 
substance (we think), only the thing. Stripped of 
its attributes there is nothing left to define the 
thing, but (we assume) there is a "substance" or 
"essence" of the thing which somehow endures 
without attributes (this assumption was the pet 
target of George Berkeley [1710/1963, p. 10]). The 
sun, for instance, has substance, but sunrise, 
sunset, hot, bright, and so on, are all empty 
attributes ofthis hypothetical "sun-ness." 
Imagining a change of scale to a much larger 
(faster) or much smaller (slower) view :reveals 
how arbitrary and flimsy our thing/non-thing 
basis of reality is. (If a microbe, for instance, could 
speak English, do you think it would make the 
noun/verb distinctions we make?) Other linguistic 
features play into our notions of reality like the 
fact that many "thing" words are past tenses of 
verbs, such as "thought" from "think." Completed 
or frozen actions become things. "Thing" itself is 
the result of discussion at a Ting or Ding 
(Germanic parliament). Or a "fact" is only a 
completed act (from Latinfacere =to make or do). 
But modern expressions give the impression of 
actions like done, packaged things on a 
supermarket shelf: "take a walk," "take a piss." 
The noun/non-noun separation is useful for 
everyday human activities, but why have we gone 
from there to believing this kind of human utility 
is the way reality is constructed? Why do we deny 
the human origin ofthe separation and pretend it 
has an absolute objective existence, apart from 
us, and we can only react to its consequences as 
though imposed from the outside by nature or 
God? And why then in our thinking is the initial 
equality of events tilted drastically to one side so 
that actions (apparently less enduring events) 
become empty shadows of things (apparently 
more enduring events)? In short, why this human 
bias for fixation and permanence? 
~ Scien.tistic Absolutes as Fixation of 
the Civilizing Process e-a. 
BY WAY of comprehending what led to events in 
Germany just before and after the Nazi 
takeover, Norbert Elias (1978) studied the 
development of manners in Europe from 
medieval times on. The main theme of his work is 
a progressive distancing from nature, both 
outwardly and inwardly. Civilizing (from Latin 
civitas = city) could be called citifying the world 
and ourselves. In brief, beginning with the 
:revolutionary shift from nomadic hunting and 
food-gathering to organized agriculture in a 
specific locale, civilizing involves the life style of 
saving and accumulating and gradually evolves a 
complex political hierarchy to account for, 
control, defend, and expand the surplus. (Note: 
politics, policy, police, etc. derive from Greek 
polis =city, parallel to Latin civitas.) 
Outwardly, civilizing involves the develop-
ment of technology to support the system 
politically and commercially and to overcome 
natural limitations that might hamper its 
inherent drive for expansion. Thus technology is 
also necessary for facilitating military conquest 
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(a predominant topic in most histories of 
civilization). With technology, the city becomes 
separated from the surrounding countryside, 
gradually relegating the countryside to a passive, 
raw material area sustaining the ever-increasing 
needs of the city. Human-made devices from 
heating and cooling systems, water- and refuse-
bearing systems, to graphic methods for 
recording with words and numbers, to clocks and 
calendars, provide an increasingly controlled or 
artificial atmosphere for city dwellers. 
The bureaucracy which must evolve with 
civilizing tends inevitably to quantify and 
standardize everything, facilitating its job of 
control. Among other things, bureaucracy entails 
dividing up previously natural areas, once open to 
all, to create ownership entities bounded by 
human-made lines like political borders. The 
apparent freedom of individualism in city living 
conceals the benefit to bureaucracy of breaking 
down all natural entities like families, subcultures 
or ecological systems, into standardized quantities 
where difference between this or that unit is merely 
numerical. A system of replaceable parts is a 
mechanistic ideal. Hierarchic organization, 
especially in emergency-handling groups like police 
and military, tends to redirect all relations toward 
itself at the top or center. Recent, extreme 
examples of this trend can be seen in both 
communism and fascism, where loyalty to the state 
was the paramount virtue, even if it meant spying 
on and betraying family members or friends. 
In evidence gleaned mainly from changes in 
language before, during and after "the scientific 
:revolution," Owen Barfield (1973) revealed a 
shrinking of participation with the world. As the 
assumptions of Descartes et al. became rei:fied, as 
science became the antinature idolatry of 
scientism, most human experience became 
"subjecti:fied" to isolated egos. Supplementing 
Elias and Barfield, with an even broader historical 
perspective, Lewis Mumford (1967, 1970) saw 
mining (or getting something for nothing) as the 
basic metaphor of technology in the service of the 
city mechanism, and his two volumes detail the 
origin and development of technology in the 
hierarchic structures of cities. Other works could 
be mentioned that support Elias' findings, like 
Jacques Ellul's (1964) detailed study of technologi-
cal society in our time. 
Continuing with Elias, the civilizing process 
inwardly involves distancing oneself from nature 
by suppressing animal features, needs and 
functions. The genteel rule that a meal not 
consist of a whole animal or recognizable parts of 
an animal distanced eating from the act of killing 
for one's food. The use of fork, spoon, napkin, and 
handkerchief in place of one's hands; adopting 
night dresses, then separate beds, then separate 
:rooms: these are just some of the many details 
discussed by Elias. Scratching, coughing, 
burping, belching, farting, wiping one's nose, 
exposing parts of one's body, relieving oneself in 
the presence of others: all such things become 
tabooed, to say nothing of restrictions on the 
sexual act itself. Strong expression of any 
emotion becomes "a scene." The body becomes 
more like a machine in conflict with one's mind. 
Natural signals of hunger, fatigue, excretory 
need, and stress are progressively ignored until 
the body seems like a willful saboteur of one's 
social activities. With ailments and aging, one's 
body takes on the semblance of a machine 
breaking down. This impression is reinforced 
nowadays with cosmetic surgery, prosthetic 
devices, and finally organ implants. 
The civilizing process could be likened to a 
very complicated form of toilet training as the 
things we possess take possession of us, and 
machines (our supposed slaves) become our 
masters. Anything that can't be used in the 
construction or fueling of machines or machine-
like social arrangements must be disposed of. 
Reminders of mortality, animality, or scientistic 
imperfection must be put out of sight ifthey can't 
be exterminated. Human excretory products are 
no longer recycled with the processes of nature, 
but dumped or burned, indiscriminately pollut-
ing the atmosphere in parallel with the 
indiscriminate disposal of industrial wastes. Old 
age becomes just a linear dead end, no longer the 
completion of a cycle and the beginning of a new 
cycle which grandparents can celebrate with 
their grandchildren. The poor, the blind, the deaf, 
the lame, the chronically ill, the mentally 
retarded, the psychotic, are segregated from urban 
and suburban life. Thus, out of sight, the 
imperfections or excreta of our age are out of mind. 
Elias showed that hygienic reasons (which 
enter later) can't account for such changes in the 
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past. Nor can the changes be attributed to 
Christian morality because they appear with 
numerous variations in non-Christian civiliza-
tions. A hierarchy develops and to avoid being 
regarded as lower class (within the city) or 
barbarian (outside the city) one must adopt (or at 
least emulate) manners of the higher echelons. 
Not only is kinship with animals taboo, all 
suggestions that one has something in common 
with humanity in general become putdowns like 
ornery (= ordinary), cheap, common, vulgar. In 
place of heathen (heath-dweller, i.e., outside a 
city), savage (forest-dweller), villain (village-
dweller), naive (native), we now have putdowns for 
outside-the-city like hayseed, rube, bumpkin, okie. 
~ 2nd Answer to Scientism: 
Spatial Polarization ea, 
ELABORATING ELIAS' theme, I'd like to point out 
that the hierarchy of the civilizing process 
evidently derives from the three dimensions of 
the human body. Up (top), right, and front are 
"good," while down (bottom), left, and back are 
"bad." There are reversals of polarity here and 
there, but for the most part the values associated 
with the three dimensions are consistent. In the 
world picture of medieval Christianity, heaven is 
above, hell below, the righteous sheep (saved 
ones) sit at the right hand of Jesus, the less than 
righteous goats (Jews, etc.) sit at the left hand of 
Jesus, the glorious illumined front belongs to 
God, and the dark and dank backside is the 
territory of Satan. The macrocosmos of God and 
Satan, and the microcosmos of the human body 
are mirror images of each other. 
The east side of the medieval church is the 
head where the altar is located and the masculine 
clergy preside. The west side is the portal where 
one enters the church (a womb) and daubs oneself 
with holy water. Men used to sit on the north side 
(right hand of the church viewed from above as a 
prone figure), women on the south or left hand 
side. As might be expected, if nature is regarded 
as feminine, insofar as the civilizing process is 
antinature, the negative dimensions of down, 
left, and back will also be identified as "feminine." 
As the world becomes depleted of its innate 
features in the civilizing process, nature must 
appear more and more uncivilized, immoral, 
wild, chaotic, antihuman. Perhaps because of 
Judeo-Christian monotheism with its patriarchal 
bias, nature (as lifeless, formless, aimless matter) 
must be shaped and controlled by externally 
imposed, masculine laws. (Note: "matter" and 
"material" are cognate to Latin mater= mother.) 
With the 17th century worldview, God's laws 
were replaced with scientific laws, usually in the 
form of mechanisms not otherwise found in 
nature, thereby deifying human rationality: 
creator of the machine and technology. In the 
Taoism of China and Buddhism of India, the 
same polarities developed but were not split into 
absolute, good/bad values. Nature, in those 
worldviews, retained its innate features and 
therefore did not need a deus ex machina to form 
and control it. Hence there are self-regulating 
"principles" in or of matter rather than Western 
style "laws" imposed from the outside on formless, 
chaotic matter. 
What about time in this three-dimensional 
picture? Time (like life and consciousness) is the 
joker in a deck of cards; it belongs and yet it 
doesn't belong because it can transcend the 
hierarchy of the deck. Time can be spatialized to 
a certain extent only, beyond which it is lost and 
with it all movement and life. It appears in 
civilized hierarchies in various ways, like moving 
from left (past) to right (future), or from front 
(future) to back (past), but this varies between 
civilizations. With our 17th century world view, 
time almost disappeared altogether in spatial 
dimensions like the x-axis of Descartes' analytic 
geometry. 
Furthermore, once time became linear only, it 
is either progressing or regressing; there is no 
other dimension of movement. And, with the bias 
for front, for youth (equivalent to immortality), 
we like to imagine that despite occasional 
setbacks, things are always getting better. This 
fits the accumulative, expansive thrust of 
technology and the civilizing process. The latest 
is the best and there is little respect for the past, 
other than commercialized nostalgia. Since 
getting something for nothing is built into our 
worldview, it doesn't usually occur to us that 
there must be compensation for getting better, 
that things could be getting worse at the same 
time in other ways. In Eastern worldviews, on the 
other hand, time resisted total spatialization, 
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retaining its beginningless, endless character, 
along with nonlinear cycles. 
~ 3rd Answer to Scientism: 
Human Senses ~ 
RETURNING AGAIN to Elias' observations, in the 
civilizing process there is top-heavy bias 
toward the eye and visual phenomena at the 
expense of the other senses, and (understand-
ably) a corresponding bias toward heady, 
abstract rationality at the expense of intuition, 
emotion, or all other experiences which seem 
more closely :related to bodily functions (espe-
cially lower body). In Galileo's one-eye metaphys-
ics, the visual attributes of color and texture a:re 
only subjective, that is, totally different from one 
individual to the next. All other sensory 
experience is likewise subjective (like personal 
noises obscuring the clarity of objective signals) 
along with the gamut of feelings. Thus, but for a 
very narrow range of vision's possibilities, every 
human being is cut offfrom the world by a bodily 
closet of obscuring subjectivities. The only escape 
to "reality" is peering though a hole with a human-
made lens (nowadays reading some gauge or 
dial) to that which alone is assumed to be 
interindividually identical and can be delimited, 
fixed, and enumerated for logical treatment. 
Most of the primary characteristics oflogic are 
closely related to vision. Vision is the only sensory 
mode that allows us to assume what we see is just 
there without visual participation having any 
part of what's seen. With hearing, and the other 
"lower" senses, we are constantly reminded of 
subject/object interaction, or our participation. 
As with vision, logic is prone to regard itself as not 
requiring any basis other than itself, taking the 
initial dosed framework within which it reasons 
or argues as ifit were not based on assumptions, 
but on given, self-evident verities. Vision is the 
only sensory mode which permits an impression 
of simultaneity, as though it operates in a spatial 
shell given all at once within which change 
occurs. Logic likewise excludes time or subsumes 
time as a mere change of position within a closed 
and fixed spatial frame. 
Unlike the lower sensory modes, vision allows 
us to ignore its medium (air, water, or that in 
which, through which, we see). Vision therefore 
can give us the impression that the gaps between 
its presented objects are empty. Logic functions 
in a similar manner, insisting on absolute 
presence or absence of an entity with nothing 
between it and some other entity (law of the 
excluded middle). Vision is highly directional and 
insists that the reality of its objects depends on 
their locatability. This, like the either/or aspect, 
manifests in logic as the assumption that anything 
real must have a definite form (delineating it 
from everything else) and be located in a specific 
place. 
As this feature evolved further, it became the 
denial of all negative aspects by abutting them to 
sites next to and dependent on positive features: 
nothing to something, absence to presence, future 
to past, known to unknown. Finally it emerged as 
the binary 1 and 0 of digital computer switches, a 
very handy device but hardly a model for 
existence. On the other hand, in hearing, one can 
differentiate between all sorts of tone pitches and 
textures without any specific location whatso-
ever. And it cannot be claimed that sounds are 
any less real than visual objects, but logic prefers 
to ignore experience deriving from other sensory 
modes. (Victor Zuckerkandl's [1956] phenomeno-
logical study of how we actually hear music is an 
excellent antidote to the habitual crippling 
sensory and emotional experience by our visual-
rational dominance.) 
If we could see a periodic series of photographs 
of any apparently fixed thing, a mountain say, 
from its appearance to its disappearance, it 
would be visually clear that it is actually an 
event. As we usually experience seeing, however, 
there is a simultaneity of things that hides the 
changing of space itself. While giving lip service to 
things having origins, logic follows vision in 
assuming that the space of all its events is just 
there, that is, does not come into existence. When 
we talk of eternity, it's usually thought of as 
proceeding from now on. We fail to allow for a 
preceding eternity, or the likelihood that an 
unending universe has no beginning either (unlike 
the Eastern world views mentioned above). Here 
too, our Judeo-Christian tradition may be influen-
tial, in that it maintains that the beginning of 
everything occurred with the biblical Genesis. 
Similarly, in the worldview we inherited from 
Descartes, it is assumed that given the initial 
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conditions of Genesis (now the cosmological Big 
Bang), all subsequent events can eventually be 
mapped out. 
Time is therefore reduced to a linear 
railroad track on which potential events 
contained in the initial fixed space are unrolled in 
a strictly causal manner. Logic is not applied to 
the conditions contained in its initial assump-
tions. Until the advent of cybernetics with its 
feedback loops, all cyclic phenomena or events 
with backward affecting "aims" were ignored or 
denied. The old notions of an event "arising'' or 
"befalling'' or of the future (unknown) pulling one 
on with hope or curiosity, have been supplanted 
with the notion of the past driving the present 
like a rear-end locomotive. Meanwhile, several 
generations have agonized about how there can 
be any "free will" if life is only the mechanical 
working out of preordained circumstances, 
whether ordered or random. 
~ Revisiting Descartes' Century ~ 
I N HIS study of the 17th century in Europe, Steven 
Toulmin (1990) showed that Descartes' picture 
did not become the world view of the West because 
of its purely scientific features, but rather for its 
emotional or (more broadly) religious features. In 
an era when famine was prevalent because of a 
series of bad years climatically, when thousands 
of people were dying or being displaced in battles 
between Catholics and Protestants, when people 
were interpreting these and other painful events 
as omens for the end of the world, Descartes' 
picture promised a rational certainty. In effect, it 
idealized and mathematized the civilizing 
process, offering to unify opposing factions by 
setting up nature as the common enemy of 
humanity. Nature was to be overcome by the 
divinely appointed faculty of rationality in the 
form of science and technology. Additionally, 
Descartes' picture of nature as lifeless matter 
offered the leading powers of Europe a moral-free 
justification for overseas expansion and exploita-
tion of the flora, fauna, and people of the New 
World. And with acceptance of this picture, 
scientism came into being. 
Coming back to the theme of the civilizing 
process, whence comes the human longing for 
permanence, predictability, and so forth? Why 
was Descartes' promise of rational certainty so 
appealing in the 17th century, and why does its 
scientistic form still prevail? Summarizing the 
religious origins of Western philosophy from the 
ancient Greeks to our time, Bertrand Russell 
(1945) said, "Religion seeks permanence in two 
forms, God and immortality'' (p. 45). And, 
although he had an antireligious orientation, 
Russell was forced to admit on the next page that 
in seeking "a permanent substratum" science 
also tries to transcend or even deny time. If the 
idealistic goal of predicting everything could 
actually be achieved, all events future and past 
would be laid out like points on a vast map, 
reducing time to a single picture of all events 
simultaneously, lifeless because timeless. To 
rephrase our question then, why is time or 
change such a threat? A general explanation 
offered by Ernest Becker (1979) and others is the 
denial of death. 
~ Denial of Death ~ 
W E TEND to accept time with the proviso that 
it stand still once it has produced whatever 
we value. We forget that the beauty of flowers is 
related to the fact that they soon disappear. 
Rocks, or enduring things can be beautiful too, 
but not with the same poignancy of flowers. 
Awareness of mortality is realizing the vulner-
ability of life, its briefness, hence its value. The 
young of any species are "adorable" because of 
this vulnerability; their death seems particularly 
tragic. Protecting oneself, one's mate, one's 
children, one's house, or one's reputation is 
natural. But beyond a point, trying to protect or 
ensure the future of anything becomes a denial of 
life. Any style of life which entails amassing 
(whether it be food, money or knowledge) is in 
danger of becoming a denial oflife. The more one 
has to protect, the more one is likely to become 
obsessed with protection as an end in itself. The 
extolling of poverty in Christianity and other 
religions is not a denigration of wealth per se, but 
a reminder of the smug but fearful and combative 
attitude which tends to accompany a thing-
cluttered, thing -protecting existence. 
Without disappearance there can be no 
appearance, and without death there can be no 
life. When death is regarded in the broadest 




sense, it becomes impossible to segregate it from 
life. When you exhale, go to sleep, experience a 
sexual orgasm, forget something-all these are 
types of disappearance necessary to life. Without 
disappearance there can be no genuine newness 
or freshness. Without experiencing the contrac-
tion of weakness, failure, pain, and other "down" 
phases, one cannot realize compassion and the 
intensity of existence. To deny death therefore is 
to deny life. Statements like "I'll never love again" 
or "I'll never trust so and so again" are denials of 
life in the attempt to protect oneself from the pain 
of change. One might as well desire to be a 
million-year-old sun-baked desert rock instead of 
a sentient, vulnerable being. Some people try to 
remain immortal by not growing up. Others deny 
their gender in the illusion that the animality of 
gender is the beginning of aging and death. 
Others believe they can insure a long life by 
spending just a little life each day. The ways of 
denying death are numberless. 
Downward, leftward, backward, pastward, 
darkward, smallward: All the apparently "nega-
tive" dimensions must be readmitted equally to 
one's awareness. Living-dead, zombies, vampires, 
ghouls, ghosts: what monsters popular imagina-
tion has created in trying to deny disappearance. 
It is as though something horrible is better than 
what seems to be the only alternative to deified 
something, namely oblivion or nothing at all. 
Modern living transcends ghosts for the most 
part, but fear of emptiness, silence, and such is 
present everywhere, like densities of city building, 
background music in stores, and other distrac-
tions. In a literal interpretation of the Bible, 
death is the penalty for the sin of Adam and Eve. 
But then what? Hell is not disappearance; it is a 
place of endlessly repeating the same inane 
scene. Punishment is not so much the :fire and 
pitchforks of hell; it's the lifeless and deathless 
monotony of mechanical immortality. And it bears 
a remarkable resemblance to the final conse-
quences of scientism. 
It might appear that I'm saying all human 
problems result from the civilizing process as 
epitomized in scientism, hence that I advocate 
turning back the clock. No! Like Adam and Eve 
eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge, the 
civilizing process is inevitable. This is not to say 
it's a process which has no perils and can be 
trusted mindlessly to progress forever upward. 
The process of abstracting is all right as long as 
the end is a return to life. Its danger lies in the 
tendency to become an end in itself, denying its 
origins, replacing living. 
The civilizing process is like scaffolding being 
erected to build a house, then becoming so huge 
and elaborate that the end, living in the house, is 
forgotten. A healthy world view must encompass 
and allow a proper place for everything beneath 
and prior (or primitive) in human experience. 
This means a balanced view that's not deluded by 
something for nothing and allows for necessary 
compensation of all events in their relevance to 
living. Rationality and science are here to stay 
and, when relating modestly and equally with 
other human activities, are irreplaceable. But a 
technology with worldwide destructive potential 
in the service of a lopsided view of nature and 
human nature-that is the scientism we must see 
through. 
~A Buddhist View ~ 
BUDDHISM BEGINS with complete affirmation of 
time or impermanence, and an emphasis on 
the misery we human beings undergo because we 
cannot :finally escape time by inventing a 
deathless realm anywhere. Buddhism also 
affirms the urge for permanence but (unlike most 
religions, philosophies or sciences) insists that 
permanence must be realized with imperma-
nence, not in the denial of impermanence. 
Likewise life must be realized with death, 
(whether death is conceived as down, left, behind, 
past, dark, or nonexistence). 
A Zen Master looks for the doubt which stems 
from your longing for an absolute, unchanging (or 
immortal), all-encompassing ground, versus your 
skepticism that none of your emotional invest-
ments are indeed the absolute you seek. A Zen 
Master pushes you back into that doubt when you 
try to quell it by insisting you've already found it 
in this or that religious object, scientific 
formulation, or true love. He bastes you in the hot 
oil of your doubt when you :flee to amusing 
distractions or cover up with rationalizations. Of 
course, most people can't abide Zen Masters for 
very long. To sustain the necessary awareness of 
doubt entails great faith, and there's a paradox. 
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Faith in what? Perhaps it could be called faith 
that there is a satisfactory resolution to the basic 
questions of existence. But this faith must 
proceed with the constant caveat that the 
resolution cannot be located in any object or idea 
apart from oneself and, further, that one's "self'' 
is not an object or thing. 
With a Zen view (or in immediate experience), 
there is no such thing as a thing, that is, no event-
entity which is completely isolated, fixed, 
permanent, immovable, and independent of 
internal changes and external influences. Yet we 
usually define what's "real" in terms of being 
fixed, permanent and so forth. With a Zen view 
not only is everything inextricably related to 
everything else, each apparent entity is itself a 
relationship. There are no ultimate, irreducible 
particles of existence for scientists to finally 
discover because each particle is itself a 
relationship, and each relationship is changing 
internally and externally. There is no ultimate, 
vast, completely simultaneous entity like 
"universe" which remains forever the same like 
an overall container of changing event-things. 
What we take to be the universe is changing 
along with all it contains. Indeed, with a Zen 
view, every part of any whole contains that whole, 
as exemplified in the modern hologram where the 
whole picture and all its parts are somehow 
contained in each part. There is no eternally 
enduring entity apart from the holistic network 
of relationships. Likewise, there is no pure 
nothing any more than there is a pure something. 
Something/nothing is a temporal relationship 
rather than a mutually exclusive antagonism. 
With a Zen view, it might be said that "ego" is 
one's total worldview, including one's notion of 
"1." It is the totality of our notions about existence 
as well as how we regard ourselves in that 
picture. It consists of more or less fixed notions 
about existence (good/bad, right/wrong, etc.) 
which act as a filter for immediate experience. It 
is mainly a learned system of preselections or 
prejudices into which all experience is allocated. 
The more rigid its categories the more 
constricting its effect on immediate experience. 
Since it includes external phenomena it is just as 
much outside as inside the human body. 
Psychology then has no proper basis unless all 
aspects of a worldview are acknowledged and 
explored, especially those features which became 
fixed in the attempt to cast "mind" in the mold of 
Newtonian physics. 
The sense of"I am" and the sense of everything 
else (or not "I am") have neither a fixed location in 
a brain nor are they functions limited to a brain. 
Brain, nervous system, organs of perception and 
so forth are necessary aspects of"am/am not" but 
none by themselves are a sufficient explanation of 
our experience. While any theory of existence can 
hold up an aspect of our experience as necessary, 
no theory can legitimately be advanced as 
complete and therefore self-sufficient. (Here lies 
the aforementioned difference between science 
and scientism.) It is usually assumed that "I am" 
lies only on this (the body) side of the subject/ 
object polarity. But "am/am not" is actually the 
interaction of both subject and object. 
~ Nagarjuna's Dialectic ~ 
A NYONE WHO engages in Zen meditation will 
soon realize how strongly entrenched and 
resistant to alteration the categories of one's 
worldview are. This is especially the case with the 
subject/object split. Enormous effort including 
much intellectual work is needed to clear away 
the pseudoabsolutes of one's mental clutter and 
accompanying emotions. "Man knows nothing till 
he knows how not to know" says Lawrence (1933), 
and the outstanding demonstration of this is the 
classic thesis by Nagilljuna, a 2nd century A.D. 
Mahayana Buddhist author (see: Garfield, 1995; 
Murti, 1980; Ramanan, 1966; Streng, 1967). 
Instead of attempting to resynthesize what had 
been pulled asunder by the nit-picking logicians 
of ancient India, Buddhist and non-Buddhist, he 
took logic as his tool and turned it on logic itself. 
Logic is a closed process and cannot proceed 
without assuming an initial (unprovable) frame-
work like a chessboard where events are 
regulated by well-defined rules. Disproof of any 
hypothesis is demonstrated by logically uncover-
ing a contradiction of some sort, proof by showing 
there is no contradiction. Nagfujuna therefore 
takes every conceivable notion of reality 
discussed in his time, and, by extending it a few 
steps further than its proponents have, demon-
strates an inherent contradiction. He shows, for 
instance, that once we have settled on a plurality 
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of any kind, we can never logically change it to a 
unity, or vice versa. 
The net result of Nagarjuna's endeavor is the 
realization that all our notions of "reality" are 
just that, notions, or metaphors, not reality per 
se. For common everyday activities, notions like 
quality-reduced quantities or linear causality are 
quite useful. But, as soon as we objectify or 
thingify any notion to an eternal attribute or law 
of the universe, forgetting its human origin, 
regarding it as imposed on us from the outside, 
we err grossly. In Judea-Christian terms, we 
create an idol, thus violating the Second 
Commandment about not depicting God in any 
manner whatsoever. (With a Zen view, however, 
the biblical description of God as masculine, 
favoring one group of people over another, acting 
with revenge, and so on, is already idolatry.) 
That which contains all events, that from 
which all events arise and disappear to, must be 
completely neutral, with no bias whatsoever. 
Whether we personify it as "God" or de-deify it as 
"Universe" doesn't matter as long as we 
understand it is finally unknowable in the sense 
of trying to stand outside and grasp it as a 
conceptual object. This is not mysticism. Nothing 
is hidden. Indeed, because it is the most obvious 
and intimate quality of our experience, we 
constantly overlook it. So, instead of lopping off 
all experience that doesn't fit idolatrous models of 
rationality, coming home means bringing ratio-
nality back to the family of our other faculties, 
inducing it to take its proper place as a modest 
sibling rather than a headstrong, "self-made" 
despot. 
Can human beings live without reifying 
notions as idols? Can there be lovers who don't 
idolize their lovees? Can there be mothers who 
don't idolize their children? Can there be 
merchants who don't idolize money? Can there be 
government leaders who don't idolize power? Can 
there be actors and athletes who don't idolize 
public acclaim? Probably not. It seems that a 
necessary aspect of growing up involves 
centricity. Whatever one can identify with (or 
hope to identify with) will tend to be idolized in 
some manner. My family, my town, my team: 
they are the best. Scientism is supposed to have 
rescued us from such "primitive" centricity by 
showing, for instance, that the sun is the center of 
our planetary system, not the earth. But scientism 
substituted a much more dangerous idol. The 
danger is not in satisfaction with one's 
identifications. Followed through in growing up, 
one can come to appreciate other places, other 
peoples, other styles of living, without necessar-
ily giving up ones initial preferences. The danger 
lies in assuming badness, or, even worse, the 
nonexistence of whatever is not idolized. 
Like Socrates, Nagarjuna's style is dialectic. 
He does not try by argument to convince one that 
any side is better than another side. Argument is 
a rational game which rarely changes the deeply 
held convictions of people. (No major scientist has 
ever abandoned his prime theory in the face of 
arguments from contrary evidence.) Nagarjuna's 
dialectic is a dialogue prompting whoever 
participates to accept the consequences ofhis/her 
own notions. One is exhorted to cleave to 
immediate experience and not be confined or 
misled by the words of others, not even the 
revered sutras of Buddhism. Western philoso-
phers like Arthur Schopenhauer who encoun-
tered this radically empirical, highly personal, 
logic-defeated-by-logic theme in Buddhist litera-
ture, arrived at the mistaken conclusion that 
Buddhism is essentially pessimistic, even 
nihilistic. They didn't realize that the intent is 
learning how not to know (prejudge) so that 
knowing can rediscover its true source. 
It could be protested that if all notions are 
metaphoric, not literal references to (of) ultimate 
reality, then Buddhistic terms (of which there is a 
plethora) are also metaphoric. Nagarjuna not only 
admits this, he emphasizes it, probably to the 
dismay and even horror of those Buddhists of his 
day who (like fundamentalists in any religion) 
wanted a personified deity and eternally sanctified 
tenets. Naga:rjuna does not deny any experience of 
sanctity; he denies only that it can be located in any 
object apart from oneself and then captured in 
words or rituals and copyrighted as the exclusive 
property of a particular religion or sect. 
I MMEDIATE EXPERIENCE is not a copyrighted 
feature of Zen or any other Asian practice. If 
Buddhism is universally relevant then it must be 
rooted in experience that is common to and 
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therefore potentially realizable by human beings 
of all cultures. Since space here doesn't permit 
many illustrative pages which careful attention 
to Nagarjuna's work would demand, let's 
conclude with another Western writer of our 
time, the anthropologist Gregory Bateson, who 
brings up a question that can be taken as a 
sample of Nagarjuna's approach, or as a modern 
Zen koan. 
Bateson (1979, p. 98) makes a chalk dot on a 
blackboard and draws attention to the difference 
between the dot and the blackboard. Then he 
asks his audience where the difference is located. 
If the answer is that the difference is there on the 
blackboard, the next question might be, "In the 
dot or in the blackboard?" One is faced with a 
logical conflict if one locates the difference in 
either place to the exclusion of the other. To the 
answer that the difference is at the border 
between the dot and the blackboard, the next 
question might be, "Suppose I lift the chalk dot off 
the blackboard and move it away, say a foot, or a 
mile, or a thousand miles, where then is the 
difference?" With only a foot separation, the 
answer might be that it's in the air between the 
dot and the blackboard. But when the distance is 
extended, the inadequacy of the answer becomes 
evident. So the next answer might be that 
difference is located in the mind ofthe answerer. 
This leads to new problems. "Are you saying 
then that the difference is just subjective, that it 
has no existence outside of your mind?" Very few 
people, least of all a scientistically-oriented 
person, would be content with such a solipsistic 
conclusion. Unless difference has some "outside" 
existence, each human being would be totally 
isolated. There would be no dependable relation 
between inside and outside phenomena. Life as 
we know it would probably be impossible. But, if 
the answerer persists with locating difference in 
the mind only, the next question might be, 
"Where in your mind is the difference?" This 
could lead to all sorts of answers inviting further 
questions which would only reveal in detail the 
inadequacy of the location. 
Another question might be, "Since you locate 
this difference in your mind, where do you locate 
the difference between what's your mind and 
what's not your mind?" To solve that logical 
pretzel, a few answerers might make the 
"mystical" leap of George Berkeley (1710/1963, p. 
29) and say that everything is in the mind of God, 
therefore that is where difference is located 
ultimately. People of "primitive" cultures might 
say that everything in nature is alive, albeit on 
different levels, therefore "mind" is everywhere, 
actually or potentially, so difference is both inside 
and outside. However it is phrased, what this 
answer says in effect is that difference, any 
difference, is actually not locatable in the usual, 
specific sense of locating objects. 
Most Western people nowadays, having 
absorbed the scientistic view more or less while 
growing up, would probably move on to the stage 
of answering that difference is located in the dot, 
the blackboard and the mind of the observer. 
Some might refine that answer and say the 
difference is located in the space between the dot/ 
blackboard and the observer, as in light traveling 
from the former to the latter. But further 
questioning will elicit the inadequacy of these 
answers also. For example, "Where is the 
difference located when you can no longer see the 
dot on the blackboard?" Or, "Where is the 
difference located when you and the dot and the 
blackboard are in different parts of the world?" 
Ultimately the question becomes patently 
unanswerable when it is expanded to, say, the 
location of the difference between dozens of dots 
on dozens of blackboards in dozens of locations. 
Or if that is not sufficiently stumping, the devil's 
advocate of time can be brought into the equation 
with a question like, "Where was that difference 
before I made the dot on the blackboard?" and 
"Where did it go after I erased it?" 
Some people might conclude then that 
difference does not really exist, that it is just an 
illusion. If they gave such an answer to a Zen 
Master they might get hit with his stick and then 
asked, "Is this real or an illusion?" Most people 
would probably agree finally that this or any 
other difference cannot be definitively located, 
therefore that no difference exists in the usual 
sense of a locatable thing. Important conse-
quences stem from this observation. First, note 
that difference is the complement of similarity or 
identity, that both together constitute relation-
ship, hence all relationships are ultimately 
unlocatable for the same reasons that held for 
difference. Because of the emphasis on separation 
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in scientism, difference per se or "divide and 
conquer" became the basis of its metaphysics. 
Holistic approaches which emphasize relation-
ship in the form of unity and similarity became at 
best inept science. Note then that difference is no 
more solid and specifiable than similarity or 
unity. So how can it be maintained that "mind" is 
located solely in the brain when the very basis of 
such a notion is unlocatable, when it is impossible 
to specify exactly where mind differs from body, 
where subjective differs from objective, or even 
where something differs from nothing? 
The point of any koan is thinking with one's 
whole body, thinking until thinking reroots itself 
in the totality of one's immediate experience. The 
usual manner of rationality is to push a problem 
away and make it an object, thus perpetuating 
the subject/object split and reinforcing the 
arrogant hegemony of rationality. In koan work, 
the questioning process itself must become the 
whole world, including oneself the questioner in 
all everyday activities. One cannot escape the 
apparent paradox of a koan by leaning to either 
side. Great perseverance is needed to remain in 
the middle of what seems a hopeless trap. All 
one's habitual preconceptions about the nature of 
existence lose their absolute character if one can 
persevere in the center which is zero and infinity 
at the same time. 
How odd it seems that for centuries opposing 
armies in Europe prayed to the same God for 
victory, as if that God played games offavo:ritism. 
If Buddhism entertains a deity (or deities), He o:r 
She or It must manifest in a totally neutral 
manner allowing all possible polarities a free 
play. Thus, while Buddhism is not theistic in the 
Judeo-Christian sense, it is not to be confused 
with the atheistic view of scientism. And while it 
does not hold the "vitalistic" notions of some of 
Darwin's critics, it is not fixed in the opposite 
view that mind is just an epiphenomenon of 
inanimate or dead matter. The centuries-old 
conflict between Christianity and scientism might 
be resolved with a Buddhist-like view that we 
don't have to be stranded with an objectified God 
(Mind) on the one hand, or an objectified Machine 
on the other hand. (Feeling your heartbeat, for 
example, cannot be explained away in terms of 
polar extremes like animate vs. inanimate, 
intended vs. unintended, designed vs. random.) 
Finally, while meditation and koan practice is 
intensely individual, the compassion engendered 
brings one back to everyday life, to concern for 
others and everything else in the world. 
Coming home is :rediscovering "true self' or the 
eye of the hurricane from which all events arise 
and to which they return. It means experiencing 
the fresh, unique quality of any event before it's 
objectified, compared o:r quantified. It means 
realizing how you disappear and come forth again 
and again HERE, before you were born, and after 
you die. In Chrisian terms it means experiencing 
what Meister Eckhart (Blakney, 1957) called 
"The Godhead," before there is a separation of 
God (Creator) and World (Creation, Creatures). 
Your adult memory, knowledge, and concerns 
don't vanish; they are simply no longer the 
assumed basis of your life. You can speak from 
your "true home" but you can't actually define it, 
since it is no longer apart from you, hence Zen 
expressions like ":fire cannot burn itself' and 
"water cannot soak itself' and (so that you won't 
idolize oneness either) NOT TWO, NOT ONE. 
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